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This teaching case tells the story of the rebirth of CRM at KLM Royal Dutch Airlines since 2002 
and its successful liftoff during 2003, for which KLM received Gartner’s 2004 CRM Excellence 
Award. The Award presents a natural moment of reflection on past CRM achievements and future 
plans. The case allows us to  
(1) dissect a CRM success story, that contrasts nicely with many of the CRM horror stories of the 
1990s, and identify key success factors;  
(2) focus attention on the viability of the planned approach KLM uses for implementing CRM;  
(3) introduce and show the importance of program management as a construct for structurally 
growing and governing enterprise-wide investment in CRM; and  
(4) help reinforce lessons around CRM and business-ICT alignment. 
Keywords: business-ICT alignment, CRM, governance, program management 
Editor’s note: A teaching note is available to faculty who are listed in the MISRC-ISWorld Faculty 
Directory (http://www.isfacdir.org/ ). Contact the first author at stijn.viaene@vlerick.be 
 I. INTRODUCTION 
Thursday, 29 April 2004 – 8pm. Cristina Zanchi and Roderik Rodermond had just settled into 
comfortable armchairs in KLM’s Business Lounge at London Heathrow International Airport. They 
were on their way back home from attending Gartner’s European Customer Relationship 
Management (CRM) Summit 2004 in London, where they just won first prize for their successful 
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CRM efforts at KLM.1 Cristina Zanchi was the Head of Customer Relationship Management at 
KLM Royal Dutch Airlines and Roderik Rodermond was her Head of Strategy and Database 
Marketing. Both were extremely pleased with the way things went today. They were well aware 
that this award was an important next step towards convincing KLM’s Board of Directors that their 
investment in CRM was on the right track. While enjoying some refreshments Cristina Zanchi and 
Roderik Rodermond began discussing how to proceed with their CRM efforts at KLM.  
“We have to be very careful,” said Roderik Rodermond. 
“I know what you’re thinking. This first phase was crucial for the rest of the CRM Program, but the 
tricky part is yet to come,” replied Cristina Zanchi.  
“Exactly! We now have our campaign management tool up and running and it is connected to our 
new customer database. This arrangement allows us to differentiate in our marketing 
communication, the first of our customer interaction points. A good start, that’s for sure, but it’ll be 
quite a different story to differentiate our operational activities.” 
“I know, I know. Getting CRM implemented in the rest of the organization will not be 
straightforward. Inflight and Ground Services, to name just two, are all much bigger than our 
Marketing Department.” 
“And let’s also not forget that the rest of KLM is currently still very much working in an operations-
driven rather than customer-driven mode. Getting all of these people to focus more on the 
customer may prove to be quite the challenge.” 
“True … Luckily we had the full support of Paul Gregorowitsch.” 
[Paul Gregorowitsch was the Executive VP Commercial of KLM Royal Dutch Airlines’ Passenger 
Business. He reported directly to KLM’s Board of Directors. Cristina Zanchi reported to the Head 
of the Commercial Division via the VP Marketing & Brand.2,3] 
Roderik Rodermond replied: “Having the full support of the Head of our Commercial Division is no 
luxury. What support do we have in the rest of the organization? Maybe it’s just too soon to roll 
out CRM to the rest of the organization? Why not continue working on CRM from within the 
Marketing Department?” 
“I agree that a lot remains to be done within the boundaries of our own Marketing Department. 
We should not forget, however, that for CRM to really deliver on its promise, we should, 
eventually, get it into the rest of the organization.” 
“What about predictive modeling and customer analytics? We could focus more on the analytical 
part of CRM.4 Once we start producing the right customer insight and show that it is immediately 
usable for day to day practice, people will pick up on CRM and we are launched. The customer 
database is at our disposal now. We just must learn how to look at it in a smarter fashion.” 
                                                     
1 The Gartner Award is described in Appendix I. 
2 The KLM organization chart is shown in Figure 1. 
3 Note: All figures and tables are based on information provided by KLM. 
4 This terminology is in accordance with what Meta Group defines as analytical CRM, or the analysis of data 
created on the operational side of CRM and through other relevant operational data sources for the 
purposes of business performance management and customer-specific analysis. Operational CRM, 
according to Meta Group, refers to the automation of horizontally integrated business processes involving 
front-office customer touchpoints across sales, marketing, and customer service via multiple, interconnected 
delivery channels [Peppers and Rogers, 2004]. 
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Source: KLM Royal Dutch Airlines 
Figure 1. KLM Organization Chart 
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“Perhaps … One thing is for sure: It will take time for CRM to be soaked up into the entire 
organization. It’s going to be a marathon, not a sprint. There’s definitely more to it than investing 
in a data analysis suite! Remember the last time a full blown, enterprise-wide CRM initiative was 
launched at KLM?” 
Cristina Zanchi and Roderik Rodermond pondered the fate of KLM’s 1997 broadly scoped, 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT)-driven CRM endeavor that went sour and 
created a lot of skepticism about CRM within KLM. Cristina Zanchi knew that Paul Gregorowitsch 
would want her to update him on the award ceremony first thing on Monday morning. Inevitably, 
the question of what to do next would pop up and she wanted to have her answer ready by then. 
II. COMPANY BACKGROUND 
KLM Royal Dutch Airlines (now merged with Air France) was an international airline operating 
world-wide. Its home base was Amsterdam Airport Schiphol, The Netherlands. KLM formed the 
core of KLM Group, other members being KLM Cityhopper and Transavia. KLM Group’s four core 
activities were: passenger transport, cargo transport, engineering and maintenance, and 
charter/low cost flights. In fiscal year 2003/2004, KLM Group carried more than 23 million 
passengers and reported a net income of €24 million on €5,877 million revenue. The number of 
employees for KLM Group in March 2004 was 34,529  of whom 4,162 worked abroad. KLM 
financials are shown in Table 1. 
In fiscal year 2004/2005, KLM merged with Air France and became a member of the SkyTeam 
Alliance, a global alliance in which several important European, American and Asian airlines 
joined forces to make their passengers’ travel experience seamless and convenient across allied 
carriers.5 The combined entity of KLM and Air France represented the first cross-border merger of 
major European airlines. The combination would form the largest airline group in terms of 2003 
revenues and would rank third behind American Airlines and United Airlines in terms of 
passenger traffic. Alliance formation was a key element in KLM’s strategy that, as its 2003/2004 
Annual Report [KLM, 2004] said, was supposed to bring KLM closer to “a position of lasting 
strength in the global aviation industry” by strengthening “the brand values and distinctive 
character of the nearly 85-year-old company” through “synergy gains, the more favorable scope 
and scale and greater resilience.” 
KLM, as most incumbents of the European airline industry, was facing declining revenue per seat 
and increasing competitive pressure during the last several years because of deregulation in the 
European airline industry and unfavorable economic conditions. 
In December 1992 the European Union passed legislation to deregulate the airline industry. The 
directive that was issued implied that any European carrier could fly from any destination to any 
destination and demand landing slots. Opening up Europe’s skies brought about newly energized 
competition in the European airline industry, not least due to the entrance into the market of low 
cost carriers such as Ryanair and easyJet. The latter airlines put enormous pressure on the profit 
margins of the traditional airlines, making them engage in major cost cutting programs. 
At the same time the traditional airlines faced an increasing commoditization of their product 
offerings. Fares came under enormous pressure. New low cost carriers were opening up new  
                                                     
5 In September 2004, SkyTeam combined the network of nine allied carriers: Aeroméxico, Air France, 
Alitalia, Continental Airlines, CSA Czech Airlines, Delta Air Lines, KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, Korean Air and 
Northwest Airlines. Passenger benefits included more, easier, and quicker connections, single check-in, 
consistent assistance at any of the partners’ reservations centres, airport service counters or ticket offices, 
and access to more business lounges. Also, frequent flier members with any of the Alliance partners could 
earn and redeem frequent flier program miles over the whole SkyTeam network.  
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Source: KLM Royal Dutch Airlines 
Table1. KLM Financials   
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segments, attracting new customers, and taking market share away from established airlines. 
Unfavorable economic conditions, triggered by external events such as the terrorist attacks of 11 
September 2001, the SARS epidemic in Asia during 2003, and the start of the war in Iraq in 2003, 
exerted further pressure on the airline industry. 
Decreasing passenger numbers led to excess capacity in terms of fleet and personnel. Airlines 
badly felt the impact of their high fixed costs. Whether a plane was parked on the ground or flying 
with a cabin full of paying passengers, lease or loan payments had to be paid. Declining 
passenger numbers directly impacted bottom line profitability. Moreover, since the terrorist 
attacks of 11 September 2001, all aspects of aviation security were tightened. New security 
regulations forced airlines to invest further in both inflight and on-the-ground security measures. 
All of these factors weighed heavily on the airline’s costs.6 
In response, KLM in 2003/2004 set out to reduce its internal cost base structurally by €650 million 
by April 2005. This cost cutting exercise would enable KLM “to provide a better product at lower 
cost and so make up for the declining operation margins in the aviation industry.” For KLM this 
cost control program was the most comprehensive ever. It was to be implemented through a 
combination of process change, productivity gains, and product improvements. 
This need for cost cutting, however, did not imply that KLM chose to become a low cost/price 
carrier. In fact, quite the opposite was true. It knew that cost reduction alone would not guarantee 
profitability. As it stated in its 2003/2004 Annual Report [KLM, 2004], KLM’s strategic orientation 
would be geared towards differentiating itself from its competition by forging “a more direct 
relationship with its customers.” 
III. KLM MEETS CRM 
KLM realized that it could differentiate itself from its competition by offering a superior customer 
experience at every interaction point with its customers. Every customer interaction was to be 
perceived as both a great opportunity to bond with customers or prospects, and as a risky break 
point for a worthwhile customer relationship. The ultimate aim for KLM was to infuse CRM – as a 
business philosophy enabled by extensive investment in ICT – into the complete KLM Circle of 
Contacts (Figure 2), and make the relationship with its customers as intimate as possible. 
A first major CRM project was set up in 1997. Under the leadership of the ICT Department. With 
the help of external consultants the company started with an extensive study on what 
opportunities CRM could offer KLM and what ICT capabilities would need to be set up to make it 
happen. The Customer Management Project was developed. The primary objectives for this 
project were: 
• Implementation of better customer identification and recognition capabilities at all 
customer interaction points throughout KLM; 
• Improvement of customer data gathering, integration, and use; 
• Creation of a well architected, strategic ICT platform that would replace the current, 
organically grown ICT legacy infrastructure7. 
                                                     
6 For a more elaborate analysis of the competitive situation of KLM see [KLM 2004]. For a more in depth 
analysis of the European airline industry, see Paul and Hartmann [2003]. Another good reference covering 
the airline industry is Costa et al. [2002]. 
7 ICT infrastructure is the collection of computer hardware and software that forms the backbone of a 
company’s computer services. It consists of databases, communication networks, Internet services, network 
routers and ICT support staff. ICT applications, such as customer care applications, use this infrastructure to 
access and update data, and to communicate with other applications. The way in which these different 
components are connected is called ICT architecture [Robertson, 2004].  
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Figure 2. KLM Circle of Contacts 
 
With these capabilities in place, KLM would be able to steer its customer interactions more 
systematically based on valuable customer intelligence. The project plan also included a limited 
set of rough (gu)es(s)timates that quantified the return on the ICT infrastructure investment to the 
business. A rigorous analysis of the linkage between this investment and the company’s financial 
results was, however, labeled in the project document as “not possible at this point in time.” Most 
attention was paid to the impact of CRM on the infrastructural and technical capabilities on the 
ICT side.  
The proposed effort, however, proved too much for the organization to digest. In the end, this 
broadly scoped, ICT-driven CRM project did not take off. This was mainly due to the high 
forecasted technology costs and the lack of support for the initiative on the business side. The 
perceived failure engendered a lot of skepticism about CRM within KLM. Many grew distrustful of 
further initiatives in this area. CRM largely disappeared from the management agenda in 1997. 
Instead, KLM focused on alliance creation. Between 1997 and 2001 KLM engaged in an active 
search for an alliance partner in the airline industry. The search was not successful. In 1999 KLM 
called off an impending alliance with the Italian airline Alitalia, and in 2001 an alliance deal with 
British Airways fell apart. 
III. CRM REBORN 
When Paul Gregorowitsch was appointed Executive VP Commercial of KLM Royal Dutch Airlines’ 
Passenger Business in April 2002, he took CRM from under the dust. He was given responsibility 
for all global passenger sales, distribution and marketing activities. He was also responsible for 
revenue management and pricing. He reported directly to KLM’s Board of Directors. Paul 
Gregorowitsch joined KLM in 1980. He served in a variety of sales, marketing and servicing 
management positions within KLM, moving up to become Executive VP Commercial of KLM. He 
knew KLM as operations-driven rather than customer-oriented. He believed that KLM suffered 
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from far too limited possibilities for personalized service and from too many inconsistencies in 
service delivery. 
One of the first things Paul Gregorowitsch did as Head of the Commercial Division was to make 
CRM into one of the strategic building blocks on which he would build KLM’s future commercial 
strategy. He envisioned three building blocks for KLM Commercial: (1) the customer, (2) CRM 
and (3) e-business. These building blocks consistently reappeared in meetings, monthly 
newsletters, and other communication with the rest of the company. His evangelization of CRM 
went down as well as up to KLM’s Board of Directors. Still, a lot of lingering skepticism remained 
within KLM about the effectiveness of CRM.  
In June 2002 a new Customer Relationship Management Department was created within the 
reorganized Commercial Division (Figure 1). Its mission, set by Paul Gregorowitsch, was “to 
make every customer interaction into an opportunity to enhance the customer’s buying and 
traveling experience, and to increase and sustain company profitability.” The department was told 
to work on establishing capabilities for “differentiating services to customers in an efficient and 
cost-effective way.” Cristina Zanchi was appointed to head this new Department. She joined KLM 
in 1989, and served in a variety of sales, marketing and servicing management positions. In her 
previous position she reported directly to Paul Gregorowitsch (at the time VP Sales & Marketing). 
Now, within the new structure of the Commercial Division, she would report to Paul 
Gregorowitsch via the VP Marketing & Brand, Simone Wickenhagen. Getting direct access to 
Paul Gregorowitsch about CRM matters would not be a problem though. 
The overall objective for CRM remained the same as in 1997, that is, to make KLM a truly 
customer-centric organization and, in this way, turn around the negative trend of declining yields. 
Still, Cristina Zanchi had witnessed the demise of the 1997 CRM initiative, and she understood 
very well that she would need to tackle the propagation and institutionalization of CRM throughout 
KLM quite differently. Instead of rushing into broad-based CRM rollout that was supposed to 
incorporate every customer interaction point at once, the new approach would start out modestly 
with highly focused investments that would be relatively narrow in their scope and offer a clear 
return on investment (ROI). The real business gains from these targeted initial investments in 
CRM would help to win broader management and line support and act as springboards for further 
and more ambitious CRM projects. The plan was to use a phased approach to CRM 
implementation as outlined in Figure 3. 
Cristina Zanchi was also fully aware that the path towards becoming a customer-centric 
enterprise would involve complicated technological issues and require crucial and significant 
investment in ICT to make it happen. Still, from the very start she stressed that the business 
rather than ICT would call the shots. Of course, business and ICT would need to work closely 
together. 
Campaign management8 was chosen as a first CRM project. Cristina Zanchi knew that the choice 
of the first CRM project new-style would be crucial. There was no room for failure because failure 
would play into the hands of the skeptics, with a definite risk that CRM would be buried anew for 
for several years. The project was termed CIAO9 (Customer Insight, Analysis and Opportunities). 
CIAO was a project that would introduce CRM in KLM’s marketing communication to allow the 
company “to deliver the right offer to the right customer at the right time and via the right 
channel.” More specifically, the CIAO project aimed at what was called “closed loop campaign 
management” via: 
                                                     
8 Campaign management is a marketing tool used to obtain new customers and ensure the loyalty of 
established customers by providing continuous, permission-based, and promotional communications, 
according to the customer’s interests [Shaw and Taggert, 2000]. 
9 To reinforce the idea that CRM was her project, Cristina Zanchi opted for an acronym with an Italian flair.  
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Figure 3. Planned CRM Rollout   
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• Identification of customer value segments; 
• Better understanding of customer needs and preferences; 
• Creation of targeted marketing and sales campaigns for specific customer segments; 
• Monitoring of customer responses; 
• Applying experiences to future campaigns; 
• Better steering of customer buying and traveling behavior. 
What drove the decision to go for this project as a first CRM project, besides it being able to 
produce fast, measurable ROI, was that the initiative would be embedded completely within KLM 
Commercial, which clearly limited risks. That is, strategy, investment, execution, and control of 
CIAO would all ultimately be under Paul Gregorowitsch. Whereas other senior managers tended 
to cut budgets on customer related projects when things became tough in the past, this response 
would probably not happen immediately with Paul Gregorowitsch.  
What also made life easier for Cristina Zanchi was that the Marketing environment in which the 
project would be deployed was relatively small and sympathetic to the idea of CRM. Such would 
not have been the case if the first CRM project was placed, for example, within KLM Ground 
Services, where customer centricity came much less naturally. Ground services, like many other 
parts of KLM, were still operations-oriented, which would only complicate matters. Although some 
of the managers there were open to the idea of CRM, they still were very much concerned with 
the increase in unit cost CRM would imply for their Departments. 
In June 2002 Cristina Zanchi and her team started the search for vendors to deliver the 
necessary CRM technologies for CIAO. Requirements were determined up front and a Request 
for Information was sent out in mid June. All the 12 vendors that responded were then scored 
extensively and transparently. Cristina Zanchi made sure to involve both the ICT people and the 
business users in the scoring to help to create the necessary buy-in from these key stakeholders. 
The selection process was also a good opportunity to include them in the investment decision-
making process. Including them made them jointly responsible for the decision and also took 
away some of the danger of later criticism. 
In September 2002 E.piphany was selected to provide campaign management software and to 
help set up a central customer database that would be fed into the campaign management tool. 
With this database in place, KLM would be able to support general querying and reporting on 
customer data; campaign setup and execution; monitoring and reporting; and enhanced e-
mailing. With the choice for E.piphany KLM did not opt for the tool that offered the most 
functionality, or was most popular in the market. As Roderik Rodermond put it, KLM chose the 
vendor that qualified as “the best match with our CRM goals and willing to go a long way in 
thinking along on how to best support our CRM business needs.” The latter meant that E.piphany 
would be actively involved in the execution of the first campaigns supported by its software, as 
part of the same fixed price deal. The implementation of the E.piphany campaign management 
application began in January 2003. As planned, the first tool-driven campaign went live, on time 
and under budget, in mid-August 2003, on completion of the CIAO project. Global rollout was 
scheduled to follow in the next three months. In the meantime, KLM started working on the 
centralized customer database which would be released in a first phase in December 2003. 
IV. INTEGRATED CUSTOMER DATA 
With CIAO, the airline wanted to move beyond just the sole intention of rewarding customers for 
spending more of their patronage with KLM. It set out to build a true relationship with its most 
valuable customers based on integration and consolidation of its data on these customers. Thus, 
a central customer data repository was considered essential. The repository would serve as the 
basis for creating customer value segments that could be used by the enterprise to tailor its 
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interaction with individual customers based on the value of those customers to KLM. At the time, 
most of the necessary customer data resided in the KLM’s Flying Dutchman (FD) frequent flyer 
program. Still, over a dozen other databases within KLM contained useful customer data. For 
example, data on the monetary value of a customer's flying was not available within FD. It was 
embedded in an Accounting database. The same went for data on customer complaints that 
resided in a Sales database or for data on incidents (for example, delay, cancellation, or 
downgrading), that resided in an Operations databases. Also, corporate customer data was not 
linked into individual customer data.10 All this useful customer data basically needed to be 
integrated to arrive at what is called “the single view of the customer.” It was only on this 
foundation that CIAO campaign management could be run in a consistent manner. Thus, in 
parallel with CIAO, Cristina Zanchi launched a complementary project for setting up a central 
customer database, named the CDB project, in support of CIAO.  
The CDB project would also be the first major step in the implementation of KLM’s new ICT 
architecture and infrastructure in support of enterprise-wide CRM. Over the years, Marketing, 
Sales, and Services largely developed their ICT systems independently. They created their own 
databases, their own business rules and analytics, and set up proprietary business processes for 
supporting their own CRM-like activities. Much of the existing customer data was duplicated, 
giving rise to data quality issues. There was hardly any integration. The old ICT infrastructure 
reflected an architecture of data/business rule/process silos, as depicted in the left pane of Figure 
4. The new infrastructure, on the other hand, would be architected along the lines of the right 
pane of Figure 4. The architecture consisted of a single view of the customer data, and unified 
business rules, analytics, and processes for Marketing, Sales, and Services. Issues of ownership 
and accountability would need to be addressed, of course, to be able to maintain the whole. In 
time, all customer interaction points of KLM’s Circle of Contacts (Figure 2) were expected to be 
linked in to the single view of the customer data. Moreover, they would share the responsibility of 
growing its value by helping to enrich it, to populate it with quality data, and to make use of that 
data effectively. 
By digging through the centralized customer data, Cristina Zanchi and her team relatively quickly 
found that frequent flier mileage was not the best indicator of customer value to the airline, though 
it was used for years in FD to differentiate service delivery. The analysis of frequent flier data with 
other customer specifics such as the frequency, recency, and monetary value of flying, and with 
demographic customer variables (such as gender, marital status, household composition, house 
ownership, and profession), allowed KLM to obtain greater insight into its customer base. 
Customer insight was eventually synthesized into a much better customer value segmentation 
model. What KLM, for example, discovered was that in 2002 roughly 25 percent of its most 
valuable customers, were not in the top FD membership level. These customers systematically 
missed out on the service that was specifically designed for KLM’s most valuable customers. 
Conversely, some customers with top FD membership did not show up in the highest value 
segment identified under CIAO, which meant that they were granted superior service than they 
were actually entitled to.  
KLM did not have to wait long for CIAO, backed by the CDB project, to prove itself a success. An 
important goal of the CIAO project was to create targeted marketing and sales campaigns and 
monitor customer responses. Instead of launching a mass marketing campaign annually targeted 
at all customers, KLM now launched several smaller campaigns targeted at specific customer  
                                                     
10 To illustrate the troublesome nature of this situation, Cristina Zanchi’s people liked to recall the story of a 
top executive of one of KLM Cargo’s largest corporate customers and his family that were denied boarding 
due to an overbooking of their holiday flight. Due to the lack of integration between individual and corporate 
customer data the KLM employee deciding on who would and who would not be allowed to board simply 
had no idea of how important this passenger really was to KLM. The seriously unpleased executive went on 
to file a complaint that caused serious upheaval at the time. Luckily it did not cost KLM Cargo the account.  
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                                        Figure 4. Old vs. New ICT Architecture  
 
segments at specifically chosen moments in time. By the first half of 2004 KLM reported response 
rates on its campaigns of 5 to 12 percent, well exceeding the industry average of 2 percent. Also, 
by making use of the Internet and e-mail, the time to market for campaigns fell from weeks to 
days. At the same time, KLM reported a 20 percent decrease in the costs of communication FD 
members compared to 2 years previously. On the revenue side, on average, known customers 
now spent 5 percent more than they did the year before. The known customer base was 
increased by 20 percent between March 2003 and March 2004. 
V. CRM PROGRAM DRIVE 
The success of the campaign management project was crucial for creating the necessary 
momentum for further CRM deployment. The ambition was to eventually transform the entire 
enterprise by creating chains of successful CRM projects. By going through the phases outlined 
in Figure 3 these CRM projects would gradually move beyond Marketing and the Commercial 
Division into other parts of the KLM organization. Paul Gregorowitsch realized that the expanded 
scope would inadvertently bring with it the need for prioritization, management, and coordination 
of initiatives across an ever larger part of the enterprise. Therefore, in March 2003, concurrently 
with CIAO, he initiated an effort in which he assigned some of his best people to work on 
reconceptualizing CRM, for later management purposes. He wanted a program of interrelated 
projects, covering the entire organization, in which everyone serves a common vision of “letting 
every customer interaction drive profitability” and a common mission of “enabling the optimal 
customer interaction and profitability by shaping KLM into a customer-centric organization.” 
VISION-INTO-ACTION TRANSLATION 
KLM’s CRM vision and mission statements were translated into the following three actionable, 
directive goals in order to establish a clear linkage between the vision and the actual CRM 
projects that would be included in the CRM Program: 
Communications of the Association for Information Systems (Volume 16, 2005) 539-558                          551 
                                                      CRM Excellence at KLM Royal Dutch Airlines by S. Viaene and B. Cumps                                   
  
• More personalized and consistent service delivery across all interaction points; 
• More customer profitability based steering; 
• More customer-centric organization. 
These three goals represented three distinct strategic pillars on which KLM needed to work long 
term to realize its CRM vision. Each goal was further translated into measurable sub-goals used 
to actually drive the different CRM projects that would constitute the Program. The business 
cases of all current and proposed projects needed to be clearly linked to these goals, as would 
their subsequent management. The CRM Program goals design is illustrated in Figure 5. 
 
                                   Figure 5. CRM Program Goals Tree  
CRM INVESTMENT PORTFOLIO 
First Pillar 
Projects with primary drivers under the first pillar of the CRM Program focused on developing 
skills and capabilities for enhancing the operational side of customer service delivery with more 
personalization and consistency. These project (group) initiatives included, among others:  
• Redesign and simplify the call center process;  
• Redesign complaint management;  
• Identify customers in all interaction points; and  
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• Deliver integrated real time view of the customer in all interaction points.  
Second Pillar 
The second pillar involved projects that focused on developing skills and capabilities that would 
enable KLM to steer service delivery and decision making effectively on the basis of customer 
profitability. The purpose was to shift more to the use of customer metrics, profiles and insight 
based on customer data. Project (group) initiatives here included, among others:  
• Optimize customer segmentation;  
• Optimize campaign management; 
• Create a customer value-based pricing model; and  
• Get insight in purchase drivers of the customer.  
Third Pillar 
The third pillar related to projects that, in broad terms, focused on facilitating and managing the 
change effort as KLM would move progressively towards a customer-centric organization. Here 
project (group) initiatives included, among others:  
• Evangelize customer-centric culture; and  
• Set up a customer-centric performance management process. 
With the third pillar of the Program the management of culture and people change would be 
embedded structurally in the CRM Program. This view recognized that strategic, business 
process, and ICT changes never took place in isolation, and that proactive mechanisms were 
necessary to get the current organization and its people to go along with the planned change. 
Without people support, each change initiative was bound to fail. This realization was all the more 
important in light of the levels of internal skepticism bred by the stalled CRM project in 1997. 
Education and Training 
Employee education and training would also support KLM’s strategic transition. KLM was, for 
example, planning CRM Master Classes to create awareness on the what, why, and how of CRM 
with middle management. Frontline staff would receive intensive operational CRM training under 
the Program. For example, frontline staff was supposed to take responsibility of enrolling high 
value customers into FD. in addition to the inflight service they were used to doing. In a first 
phase, enrollment would mainly be a paper-based process. But it was not difficult to see this 
process become automated by using pocket computers hooked into the central customer 
database. Even this relatively simple change implied quite a change in the mind sets and skills for 
frontline people. This transition was to be facilitated by the proper training.  
To reach out to each and every sales and operational unit within KLM, a network of committed 
and appropriately trained CRM Ambassadors would progressively be put in place to help 
coordinate local CRM developments, and promote and facilitate CRM advancement locally on a 
permanent basis. A CRM Community Intranet would be set up for support. All of these activities 
were designed to bring CRM close to all employees. 
Customer Scorecard 
To create the necessary visibility of the CRM Program to the rest of the organization, KLM also 
established a so-called Customer Scorecard containing a set of regularly measured Key 
Performance Indicators (KPIs) for the entire CRM Program. This monitoring device was used to 
track performance in Commercial, Inflight, and Ground Services. Together with other CRM results 
it was communicated in a monthly brief that KLM top managers sent out to KLM staff world-wide. 
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Another initiative was the gigantic board that Cristina Zanchi’s team put at the entrance of the 
Marketing floor that posted the progress on the performance KPIs in a visibly appealing way. The 
Customer Scorecard also acted as a permanent feed of triggers to initiate program, project, or 
product adjustments.  
VI. CRM PROGRAM ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
The proposed core governance11 structure designed to develop and manage the CRM Program 
drew on some of the key concepts and best practice guidance from an open methodology called 
Managing Successful Programmes (MSP). This methodology was developed by Britain’s Office of 
Government Commerce, first published in 1999 and in revised form in 2003.12 The structure of 
roles and responsibilities is laid out in Figure 6. A regularly scheduled CRM Meeting, chaired by 
Paul Gregorowitsch and made up of senior executive representatives for all key stakeholder 
groups within the KLM organization, would ultimately be accountable for the success of CRM 
within KLM.  This assembly carried the responsibility for the evolution of the CRM Program’s 
vision, mission and goals, for reviewing and approving CRM project business cases13, prioritizing 
projects, tracking the progress of the portfolio of projects, and reviewing the delivery of the 
business benefits from the business changes these projects delivered. 
PROJECT AND BENEFITS MANAGEMENT 
Each CRM project under the Program would be assigned a Project Manager who was trained in a 
project management approach. He or she would be responsible for the timely implementation of 
the project budget and quality requirements.  
Each project also would be assigned a Project Owner, that is, a business executive that would 
take on responsibility for and would be committed to realizing the business benefits from the 
project by managing the integration of the project outputs into normal business operations. This 
role would typically be assigned to a business leader from a business area within KLM that was 
most impacted by the project. This person ideally embodied business knowledge and credibility 
with the leadership of all the business areas that were impacted. The Project Owner’s role 
typically would start earlier and persist longer than the Project Manager’s. 
The business executives that took up Project Ownership were also to convene on a regular basis 
in so-called Business Executive Meetings, chaired by a CRM Program Manager. These Meetings 
would take on responsibility for monitoring and reviewing the project portfolio and its management 
on a more regular basis than the CRM Meeting, which they supported and reported to.  
PROGRAM MANAGEMENT 
Managing the CRM Program on a day to day basis was the responsibility of the CRM Program 
Manager. This manager was responsible for supporting and facilitating the work of both the CRM 
Meeting and the Business Executive Meeting. For example, in support of the CRM Meeting, the 
Program Manager was supposed to filter the list of potential investment projects to a selected set 
of strategy-focused initiatives, and ensure that all planned and budgeted initiatives were 
developed into business cases and were assessed by the CRM Meeting.  
                                                     
11 Governance, as in corporate governance, refers to the use of transparent structures and 
processes that specify how decisions are made, carried out, reinforced, and challenged, and who 
will be responsible and accountable for these decisions.  
12 See [Office of Government Commerce, 2003] or http://www.ogc.gov.uk/ for further information 
about MSP best practice guidance. 
13 Business cases that were approved by the CRM Meeting went on to obtain final approval and 
allocation of resources and budget by the Investment Committees at KLM Division level.  
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Figure 6. CRM Program Roles and Responsibilities  
 
The Program Manager’s job was to ensure that a strong link was maintained between the 
projects being executed and the strategic relevance and rationale for them. He would also be 
responsible for managing project resources, and for enabling the coordinated delivery of projects 
within the Program, efficiently and consistently.  
ENTERPRISE ARCHITECTURE MANAGEMENT 
Process Managers were expected to be instrumental in aligning and integrating individual 
projects across functional, geographic, and other boundaries. Strategy, Process, ICT, and People 
constituted the four areas of specific expertise that were assigned a Process Manager. Their job 
was to ensure consistent decision making and change management in each of these areas 
across the entire enterprise.  
VII. CRM PROGRAM LIVE 
In mid-2003 the CRM Program was ready to be implemented. At least, the minimal management 
skeleton could be activated for supporting clear and coordinated decision making, control of 
resources as a whole, and for ensuring the realization of benefits for further CRM projects across 
an ever larger part of the KLM enterprise.  
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The CRM Meeting of September 2003 set out the lines for the next phase of the CRM Program. 
Four priorities would govern next year’s activities: 
• To realize the maximum business benefits from the CIAO project. That is, all marketing 
campaigns supported by the new software tools would start running and be managed. 
This task included developing and rolling out a modular training program for CIAO. The 
objective was for marketing to change gradually from “mass” to “one to one.” The CDB, 
that would allow supporting the new campaign management environment to the fullest, 
would be released in a first phase in December 2003.14 
• To stimulate data and insight capture that enriched the single view of the customer. Most 
of the effort would go to Inflight projects. This work included setting up the onboard 
enrolment of passengers in FD. More than just data capture was involved. For example, 
cabin crews were to recognize high potentials, based on their own judgment, and 
immediately enroll them as Elite Guests into the program.  
• To increase the availability of customer information for personalization in pre-, in- and 
post-flight services. The objective was to at least be able to recognize customers and 
address them by name where possible. This goal, for example, was reflected in 
personalized campaigns and information e-mails. Also, cabin crews would be given more 
information on frequent flier passengers in their Passenger Information Lists for 
personalizing their Inflight services.  
• To drive cultural change. Training programs were launched to accompany CRM-driven 
change projects. Awareness creation initiatives were set up for pre-, in- and post-flight 
services. For example, on a regular basis special Customer Days (including a speech by 
Paul Gregorowitsch) would be organized for servicing staff. The CRM Ambassador 
program was to be deployed gradually across the entire organization to put structural 
CRM communication in place. The Customer Scorecard and KPIs would form the basis 
for a new CRM Management Information System that included Commercial, Inflight and 
Ground Services. 
VIII. CRM’S FUTURE AT KLM 
Cristina Zanchi was mindful of what she told a journalist at the reception following the award 
ceremony in London:  
“Although we only started our CRM program quite recently, we are satisfied 
with the results achieved so far. In winning this award, we hope to have 
reached a point where we can swiftly implement the next phases of CRM in 
a bid to positively influence our customers’ buying and traveling patterns.” 
The approach she and Paul Gregorowitsch took for making CRM into a success at KLM, despite 
the skepticism resulting from the 1997 affair, turned out to be quite rewarding. However, up till 
now, CRM mainly flourished within the rather protected Marketing environment. How difficult 
would it be to install CRM into the rest of the organization? How would she guarantee that the 
CRM wave would not lose its current momentum? What would need to receive priority? These 
were all questions she could expect from Paul Gregorowitsch on Monday morning.  
                                                     
14 In February 2004 it was decided that further development of the CDB would be put on hold until 
the merger between KLM and Air France would definitively be settled. This merger was officially 
announced 30 September 2003 but still needed to be investigated by the European Union’s 
competition authorities. The actual launch of the share exchange offer was planned for the first 
half of March 2004. On May 4, 2004 Air France and KLM officials announced the successful 
closing of the share exchange. 
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IX. QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION 
1. Why do you think KLM won the Gartner 2004 CRM Excellence Award? 
2. How would you characterize the approach taken by KLM to infuse CRM into the 
organization? How does it differ from the 1997 approach? 
3. How difficult will it be to move CRM beyond Marketing into the rest of the KLM 
enterprise? Why? Which approach would you take to roll CRM out into the rest of the 
KLM organization? Where would you start? 
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APPENDIX I. GARTNER AWARD 
 
On 10 May 2004 Gartner Inc., one of the large commercial providers of research and analysis on 
the global information technology industry, in an official press release [Gartner, 2004] announced 
KLM Royal Dutch Airlines as the winner of its CRM Excellence Award for Europe, the Middle East 
and Africa. Gartner's CRM Excellence Award recognized outstanding CRM initiatives based on 
criteria defined in Gartner's Eight Building Blocks of CRM: (1) vision, (2) strategy, (3) valued 
customer experience, (4) organizational collaboration, (5) processes, (6) information, (7) 
technology, and (8) metrics. The award was presented at Gartner’s European CRM Summit 2004 
in London on Thursday, 29 April 2004.  
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Gartner invited applicants to submit case studies for the competition that described their CRM 
initiatives and highlighted why they demonstrated CRM excellence. A review team of Gartner 
analysts then evaluated and rated each entry with respect to Gartner’s Eight Building Blocks of 
CRM. The Gartner analysts selected three finalists: Nationwide Building Society, Ducati, and KLM 
Royal Dutch Airlines. They presented their cases at the London CRM Summit. The audience was 
made up of business and ICT professionals with an interest in CRM, including project managers, 
consultants, analysts, and customer service, marketing, sales, and ICT managers and 
executives. 
The 280 conference delegates voted to select KLM, with its story on the rebirth of CRM at KLM 
since 2002 and its liftoff during 2003, as the winner of the award. The following were two of the 
comments. 
“The award highlighted the airline’s ability to combine grand strategic vision with 
pragmatic execution, and deployment of software applications with cultural 
change.”  Gartner Inc. 
"The quality of submissions this year was very high. KLM stood out because it 
set a very clear and comprehensive CRM vision and strategy. KLM’s key 
objective was to make every interaction with its customers an opportunity to 
enhance their buying and traveling experience. This was achieved by driving 
each interaction based on customer value, and has contributed to a 20 percent 
increase in their known customer base and a 5 percent increase in revenue." 
Gartner Inc. 
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